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De-Commodifying Software?
Open Source Software Between
Business Strategy and Social Movement
Ursula Holtgrewe & Raymund Werle
Focusing on open source software the origin, development and organisation of a
process of de-commodification is examined in an industry that usually relies on strong
provisions to protect intellectual property. Open source denotes a cooperative and
voluntary mode of software development cross-cutting organisational boundaries
and transcending relations of market exchange. Starting with the Open Systems
Movement in the late 1970s, which was driven by business strategic and industrial
policy interests and complemented by a spirit of mutual support in professional com-
munities, a social movement type of collective action has emerged which develops
knowledge as a public good. Competent communities share the norms of the hacker
culture and cooperate in informal relations challenging the boundaries between
private and public goods. But the open source idea has also been transformed into a
business strategy by companies who provide basic software products for free and
make money with complementary products and services.
Keywords: open source software, social movement, intellectual property
Computer software has not always been
a commodity, an industry and a market.
In the era when mainframes prevailed,
it was treated as a public good. Only with
the diffusion of workstations and per-
sonal computers has software turned
into a valuable private good which can
be traded separately from hardware. Like
other information goods, software is ex-
pensive to develop and cheap to distrib-
ute. This is why the industry relies typi-
cally on a variety of technical and legal
provisions in order to protect intellectual
property and recover the investments in
software development. Licences and pat-
ents as institutions supporting commodi-
fication are thus critical issues and con-
tested terrain in the field.
There are limits to commodification.
Early on, tendencies to avoid commodi-
fying software could be observed. Norms
of “openness” and “interconnectivity”
have been tied to the development of the
Internet in many ways – the Internet in
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turn has enabled open and informal
practices of cooperation and collabora-
tion. Recently, open source/free soft-
ware has become prominent as a coop-
erative and voluntary mode of software
development cutting across organisa-
tional boundaries and transcending re-
lations of market exchange.
In this paper, we analyse the role of
open standards and systems in informa-
tion and communication technology
(ICT) and the development of open
source/free software as instructive ex-
amples of the limitations of knowledge
commodification.
Economic theory tells us that intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) such as patents
and copyrights are legal means to pro-
tect the knowledge of an innovator, as-
suming that knowledge by itself is not an
exclusive good. Without legal (or other)
protection, it is argued, the innovator
would not enjoy the privilege of being
able to exclusively harness the knowl-
edge, and therefore individuals or cor-
porations might not be willing to invest
in innovations any more. Through IPRs
others are excluded from using this
knowledge, which means that a resource
that could be copied and distributed at
low cost is kept scarce. This creates a
market value of knowledge in which an
economic profit can be appropriated by
the knowledge owner.
Modern societies, however, have also
developed other institutional regimes of
knowledge generation and innovation. In
the academic and scientific context,
knowledge has traditionally been devel-
oped as a public good. The academic/
professional rules and rituals of establish-
ing priority and authorship, of quoting
and peer recognition encourage publica-
tion. Material incentives are (sometimes
hypocritically) disregarded while the
open circulation, correction and self-cor-
rection of knowledge is promoted.
A more radical or socially transforma-
tive logic of innovation is pursued by so-
cial movements in this area. They do not
just rely on interests, (in material rewards
or reputation) but also on normative
commitments. They value the “creativity
of action” (Joas, 1996) and the norms of
mutuality and sharing, and they seek to
extend the social space assigned to their
practices, communities and projects.
Challenging established institutions, they
create communities which promote so-
cial transformation and social innovation
aimed at greater participation and de-
mocratisation (Honneth, 1995; Holtgrewe,
2001a; 2001b). We are going to show that
open source/free software computer en-
thusiasm (hackerdom) brings these fea-
tures of social movements to technologi-
cal innovation.
These modes of innovation suggest
that commodification of knowledge is not
inevitable at all but that the boundaries
between commodification and de-com-
modification are drawn in different ways.
We are going to examine the origin, de-
velopment and social organisation of
the idea of openness in general and of
open source/free software in particular.
Activities that support open technology
promote de-commodification. Such ac-
tivities are driven by a variety of motives
– not necessarily including an explicitly
anti-commercial motive – at the level of
the individual actors, and they are em-
bedded in an institutional setting that
provides opportunities and constraints to
develop and implement public good type
technology. We argue that the emergence
of open source/free software must be
seen in the multiple contexts of profes-
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sional norms and practices, social move-
ments promoting the accessibility of
technology as a means of creative self-
expression and political and commercial
efforts to expand property rights protec-
tion and treat all kinds of software com-
ponents as marketable commodities.
After an initial definition of open
source/free software in contrast to both
proprietary software and freeware/share-
ware, we analyse an early concept of
openness in the context of standards in
ICT, where it triggered limited de-com-
modification of technology in the devel-
opment of new markets and business
strategies. In contrast to this, open
source/free software is a more radical
variant of the idea of openness. Here,
openness is taken beyond professional
norms and contexts and tied to the nor-
mative commitments of social move-
ments. After the characteristics of soft-
ware development and the motives of
developers to contribute are investigated,
we explore the development of open
source/free software through the phases
of the initial social innovations and in-
creasing popularisation and success. We
then address the strategic interests of
companies and other actors in openness,
comparing open standards and open
source/free software, and we finally con-
clude that open source/free software
combines and sustains traditions and
paradigms of innovation beyond the eco-
nomic model but is precarious in the face
of pressures towards commodification.
Open Source and Other Open
Software
Open source software is software devel-
oped in non-commercial, voluntary
projects in which a number of develop-
ers (ranging from a couple of dozen to
hundreds or even thousands of people)
create, test, improve, document and
maintain computer programs and mod-
ules of programs. This requires a pro-
gram’s source code to be accessible. Pro-
grams generally are written in higher pro-
gramming languages and then translated
into machine language (compiled). With
proprietary software, typically, the com-
piled version is sold. Open source pro-
jects describe themselves as decidedly
open in a social sense as well: everybody
who is able to deliver a qualified contri-
bution is invited to do so. Discussion
takes place over public mailing lists and
newsgroups.
Open source software can be used vir-
tually free of charge, but not all software
which is made available at no cost is
open source. Many application pro-
grams are public domain software,
which can be downloaded via the Inter-
net for free even though they have been
developed in a commercial environ-
ment. Yet such gratis software cannot be
changed by the users because the source
code is closed. There are also commer-
cial programs where the source code is
sold, such as commercial program li-
braries which are used in software de-
velopment. Furthermore, openness
does not always imply access to and use
of software at no cost. Frequently it only
means that access and use must not be
denied arbitrarily or made impossible by
levying unreasonably high charges for
access or use.1
Openness in Perspective: Open
Systems and Networks
The idea of openness has been around
since the early days of information and
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communication technology (ICT). It
serves to legitimise industrial policy,
provides a rationale for business strat-
egy and is part of professional ideology.
This will be illustrated subsequently. We
first look at the so-called Open Systems
Movement and the emergence of open
software standards. These developments
did not generally challenge the conven-
tional order of intellectual property
rights protection. Firms with a weak
market position opted for openness in
order to attract allies who had also real-
ised that they were too weak to survive
if they relied on their closed technology.
Openness in this context meant that
firms relinquished property rights to cer-
tain technical specifications, which
other firms were then allowed to share
(cf. Iversen in this issue). The compo-
nents remained proprietary; only the
interface specifications were open.
Open interface standards were therefore
intended to allow technical components
produced by different firms to interop-
erate in systems and networks. This in
the context of early computer networks
would help to achieve a “critical mass”
of users and stimulate a self-reinforcing
growth process. Thus intellectual prop-
erty rights were not conceded in general.
Rather, the boundaries between private
property and public goods were redrawn
when it appeared appropriate given the
conditions of an emerging network
economy (Shapiro & Varian, 1999).
Two elements of the development of
computers triggered the openness argu-
ment in the area of ICT. The first was the
evolving dominance of one single firm
in the computer industry. After a period
of competition for leadership in the mar-
ket for commercial computers IBM in-
troduced the System/360 mainframes in
1964. The architecture of this computer
allowed upgrades to larger machines
without rejecting existing software and
thus secured backward compatibility.
This was an extremely valuable asset be-
cause many programs and procedures
running on the mainframes were writ-
ten by system operators and could not
be purchased on the market. A market
for software effectively did not exist.
IBM’s machines attracted many new us-
ers, and the internal compatibility ad-
vantage locked them into IBM, which in
the late 1970s had a share of about 70%
of the market for mainframe computers
(Grindley, 1990).
The second element was the emer-
gence of computer networks and the dif-
ficulties of interconnecting computers of
different brands or of linking different
networks to one another. Pioneer users
of networks in the 1970s were large cor-
porations in the electronics and auto-
mobile industries, and firms in the fi-
nancial services sector. The multination-
als took the lead in creating private glo-
bal networks, primarily to facilitate in-
tra-organisational data exchange. The
major computer vendors developed
software that supported interconnection
of their machines and consequently, the
early data networks were proprietary.
They were not compatible with other
vendors’ networks and often could not
even integrate other vendors’ machines.
As a side effect, proprietary computer
networking strengthened IBM’s domi-
nant position even more.
It was the competition with IBM
which initially prompted European
computer manufacturers to engage in
activities towards open systems and
open standards. They became apparent
in several facets of the so-called Open
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Systems Movement. In 1983, eight ma-
jor manufacturers of information tech-
nology based in Europe set up the Euro-
pean Standards Promotion and Applica-
tion Group (SPAG), which aimed at fa-
cilitating the implementation of stand-
ards issued as non-proprietary open
standards by the International Stand-
ardisation Organisation (ISO) or the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union
(ITU). In 1987, SPAG initiated the forma-
tion of the European Workshop for Open
Systems (EWOS), which was created by
European associations of technology
suppliers and user organisations and
was meant to provide for collaboration
on open systems. EWOS included Euro-
pean standardisation organisations and
also, from the political side, the General
Directorate IX of the European Commis-
sion (Werle, 2001a). Two other initiatives
of the Open Systems Movement were
linked to the operating system Unix and
struggled to create a unifying Unix
standard which was truly open and com-
petitively neutral (Cool & Gabel, 1992):
X/Open, an alliance of five European
computer manufacturers, was forged in
1984 to counterattack IBM and other
non-European vendors (Gabel, 1987)
but after a few years came to include
most major international computer ven-
dors and IBM. The Open Software Foun-
dation (OSF), set up in the USA in 1988,
was a non-profit research and develop-
ment organisation sponsored by many
universities, in addition to computer
manufacturers and software firms. At the
time of the foundation of OSF, Unix was
already split into several competing sys-
tems and had partly lost its attraction as
an open system.
Other promoters of the idea of open
systems in the 1970s and 1980s were the
operators of telecommunications net-
works. The majority were national pub-
lic monopolies with an interest in ex-
panding their telephony monopolies
into the area of computer networks.
They claimed to offer openness and pro-
vide world-wide connectivity similar to
the telephone system by developing
standards according to a layered model
of computer networks. This model, the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
frame of reference, was meant to provide
a framework for open, i.e. non-propri-
etary, standards at a time when vendor-
specific proprietary networks prevailed.
Both international standardisation or-
ganisations, the ITU and the ISO, adopted
OSI in the early 1980s. Not only the tel-
ecommunications operators but also
many computer manufacturers and na-
tional governments committed them-
selves to OSI (Schmidt & Werle, 1998),
which, similar to Unix for computer sys-
tems, provided a central reference point
for the Open Systems Movement in the
area of computer networks.
With their commitment to open stand-
ards of the OSI type, most European gov-
ernments including the Commission of
the European Union pursued two goals.
They demonstrated their endorsement
of the value of openness and at the same
time used OSI as an instrument of indus-
trial policy to the benefit of European
computer manufacturers. The govern-
ments, directly or indirectly, controlled
the public telecommunications opera-
tors and tried to use their procurement
power to create a market for open com-
puter and network technology in the
sense that the standards, especially in-
terface standards, were non- proprietary.
This picture of the Open Systems
Movement as being guided by business
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and industrial policy concerns is, how-
ever, incomplete. The role of the engi-
neering profession, or parts of it, as a driv-
ing force towards openness needs to be
added. One illustration may suffice. Early
on in the area of data networks, compu-
ter scientists and engineers discussed
strategies and technical options for a
computer network which would inter-
connect all computers in the world. One
forum for discussions and preparatory
work was provided by the International
Federation for Information Processing
(IFIP), a federation of national technical
and professional societies dealing with
information processing. In the late
1970s, for instance, IFIP’s Technical
Committee 6 (data communication) dis-
cussed technical design issues in the
field of electronic mail and message
handling systems for computer net-
works. The organisation was particularly
suited to this kind of voluntary prepara-
tory work because it relied on a broad
and heterogeneous membership of pro-
fessionals from ICT corporations, net-
work operators, research organisations
and universities from different parts of
the world, and was guided by the spirit
of collaboration and exchange of ideas.
From the outset, there was a consensus
that it would not be desirable to base a
system which was to provide global con-
nectivity on proprietary technology. The
contours of a completely new system
were designed which was meant to com-
plement and subsequently replace pro-
prietary systems. The ideas were fed as
pre-standardisation work into the offi-
cial process of standard setting in the
ITU (Schmidt & Werle, 1998).
The Open Systems Movement has
shown that the openness argument was
brought to bear by significant parts of
the technical community in order to
overcome technical incompatibility bar-
riers and realise the professional ideal of
the global connectivity of computers
and networks, which would also facili-
tate global collaboration. More impor-
tant, however, was the fact that firms and
governments promoted the openness ar-
gument to neutralise market dominance
of a single firm and level the playing field.
In line with this aim was the idea of using
open systems and networks as universal
platforms to which proprietary systems
– including smaller ones which otherwise
would not survive – could be connected.
Benefits from network effects, which de-
rive from the ability to interact with other
systems and the availability of compat-
ible complementary products, were thus
to be spread more evenly.
The Open Systems Movement did not
regard openness as a radical alternative
to proprietary technology. It was not a
social movement but a strategic alliance
of actors in developing markets aiming
to influence the rules of these markets –
which, however, drew on professional
norms and values as well.
Open Source/Free Software
With the development of open source/
free software, the professional norms
and industrial strategies of openness
were translated into a different context:
from the adoption of standards to the
actual collaborative development of
software. Here, technological innovation
increasingly became social innovation.
With software for the Internet, there are no
strict boundaries between standards, ref-
erence implementations and software
packages. This is why a fair amount of
open source/free software such as Apache
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and Sendmail is involved in the running
of web- and mail-servers. However, the
best-known example of open source soft-
ware is the operating system Linux.
Software Development, Hacker Culture
and Diverse Economies
The voluntary, collaborative and informal
way of open source/free software devel-
opment requires a look into the charac-
teristics of software development in gen-
eral and into the individual motivations
of voluntary contributors.
Software development is distinct from
other fields of research and development
in several ways. The traditional view (and
self-image) of software development as
a craft or even an art (Knuth, 1972) has
been corrected by evidence of its strati-
fication and rationalisation in commer-
cial industries (Beirne et al., 1998). Yet,
it still counts as a prime example of
knowledge work, “a highly interpretive
process” (Beirne et al., 1998: 152) of crea-
tive problem-solving by applying, de-
and recontextualising knowledge. This
work, contingent and notoriously diffi-
cult to measure and control as it may be,
results in “running code,” i.e. function-
ing software. Its combination of experi-
ence, situated knowledge and formalisa-
tion then results in a specific openness:
software development has only partly
been professionalised in so far that – in
spite of the institutionalisation of com-
puter science – the field is still open to
autodidacts and people changing occu-
pations. With the diffusion of PCs and
the Internet, means of production are
accessible in private homes as well.
Professional and organisational inte-
gration of software development is com-
plemented by cultural practices and
norms shaping “communities of prac-
tice” (Wenger, 1998). They are focused
on the culture of “hackerdom” (Levy,
1984; Himanen, 2001). Hackers in this
sense are computer enthusiasts for
whom programming is an expression of
identity. Central normative orientations
of hacker culture are the freedom of in-
formation and knowledge, universal ac-
cessibility of technology and a commit-
ment to technological excellence and
aesthetics (“elegant” code). This leads to
a libertarian mistrust in hierarchies ex-
cept for those based on merit. The
boundaries between professional cul-
ture and hackerdom, then, are fluid.
Hackerdom, however, adds characteris-
tics of cultural avant-gardes, challenging
established standards, and of social
movements, seeking to transform insti-
tutions and social relations and to gen-
eralise their normative orientations.
While the actions of business firms and
governments concerning open source/
free software may be expected to follow
rational calculations, the motivations of
individual developers go beyond narrow
economic rationality (cf. Weber, 2000).
This phenomenon has been approached
from different theoretical perspectives,
drawing on theories of collective action
and public goods, of gift and reputation
economies, of intrinsic motivation and
of social movements. Often, such theo-
ries are fairly close to central elements
of the open source community’s self-
perception.
According to Mancur Olson’s (1977)
classic analysis of collective action, the
production of collective goods is the less
likely, the easier it is to free-ride, that is,
to use the goods without making a con-
tribution. In order to motivate actors to
contribute to a collective good, selective
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incentives are usually required that
promise exclusive gratification to those
who actively contribute. But if the pub-
lic good is an innovation, the socially in-
stitutionalised recognition of inventors,
founders and authors may provide an in-
centive sufficient to trigger initial con-
tributions without any additional mate-
rial reward. In this case the inventors are
satisfied with the reputation they gain.
If a minority of actors have a sufficiently
high interest in the collective good, they
will also invest in the good without need-
ing (additional) selective incentives. Af-
ter a “critical mass” of contributions is
achieved the project will attract others
to become involved (Kuwabara, 2000;
also Marwell & Oliver, 1993), especially
since software is a network good with
positive network externalities.
Eric Raymond (1998; 1999), a promi-
nent open source promoter, has argued
that open source/free software projects
function as gift economies, in which gifts
are exchanged for reputation. The im-
plicit rules of developer communities
ensure the fair distribution of reputa-
tion, which in the case of Linux is as-
signed by central and recognised au-
thorities who gratify contributors by in-
cluding their contributions, if eligible, in
new versions of the software. However,
reputation is embedded in other, quasi-
professional, norms that specify the re-
quirements to be met by developers.
Only functioning, well-written and el-
egant code is appreciated. Reputation
cannot be pursued directly, therefore,
but is gained as a diffuse reciprocal re-
ward for the gift a developer gives to the
community.
But investments in reputation may
also be guided by economic motives.
Since reputation may spill over from the
area of free projects into the sphere of
paid work, successful contributions to
open source/free software development
can turn out to be rational investments
in, notably, the careers of students of
computer science. This is confirmed by
a recent Internet survey of open source/
free software developers (Robles et al.,
2001), which includes 5,333 respond-
ents: only 19.6% of the developers have
nothing to do with the software indus-
try, 29.7% are students, 21% of the re-
spondents are paid for developing open
source/free software, and nearly half
(45.5%) have profited from open source
related activity in their careers, while
another 26% are hoping to do so in the
future. Yet 66% of the respondents spend
less than 10 hours per week on develop-
ing open source/free software.
All this suggests that developers are
fairly close to ICT professions, but strict
commercialisation is limited. Also fac-
tors beyond network externalities, repu-
tation, and career investments motivate
individuals to participate in open source
projects. These projects entail, as Rishab
Aiyer Ghosh has suggested, intrinsic val-
ues such as beauty or challenge and a
“fun factor”, which prevail in a “cooking-
pot economy” (Ghosh, 1998). Limited
individual contributions ensure access
to a wide variety of contributions by oth-
ers. The specific incentive for participa-
tion lies in using and enjoying this vari-
ety and in the opportunities of learning
and pleasure. Free-riding is not a prob-
lem since the cost of distribution of the
information goods is negligible – but
free-riders miss out on the intrinsic gains
of active participation. It should be
noted, however, that individual contri-
butions to open source/free software
projects are more unequally distributed
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than the normative idea of a “bazaar”
(Raymond, 1998) of the free and open
circulation of ideas and reputation sug-
gests: among the 13,000 authors of the
Linux kernel mailing list, who submitted
some 175,000 contributions between
July 1995 and April 2000, 2% had written
more than half of the contributions
(Moon & Sproull, 2000; cf. Ghosh &
Prakash, 2000).
Most interpretations of individual
motives for becoming involved in open
source/free software are biased towards
either straightforward economic factors
or programmatic and philosophical el-
ements. They ignore specific social con-
texts, structural and institutional con-
straints and opportunities, and the logic
of the different open source/free soft-
ware projects. Celebrating individual
creativity and technological progress,
the ”philosophical” approaches reiterate
the norms or “ideology” of hackerdom.
This indeed provides a generic element
of open source/free software. Yet under-
standing open source/free software re-
quires more detailed sociological inves-
tigation. In the following sections we will
examine the histories of key projects in
order to identify relevant contexts and
logics of development.
Unix: Academic Communities and
Telecommunications Engineering
Traditions
An account of the different facets of open
source has to start with the operating
system Unix, which, as we have pointed
out, was already a focal reference point
of the Open Systems Movement. Unix
and the associated programming lan-
guage C was developed by the Bell Labs,
the research facility of the US telecom-
munications corporation AT&T. It was
originally intended for in-house use by
AT&T, but its significance for the com-
puter industry soon became obvious.
Work on this operating system had al-
ready started in 1965, and in 1972 the
first version of Unix written in C was
available. This facilitated portability of
Unix from the beginning. It could oper-
ate on every computer which supported
a C-compiler (Dunphy, 1991). As a result,
machines from different vendors were
compatible if Unix was implemented.
These computers could be connected
via telephone or data networks and ex-
change information. At the time Unix
was developed, AT&T enjoyed a regu-
lated telephone monopoly in the USA.
However, regulation restricted AT&T to
the telephone business and barred it
from commercial activities in the com-
puter industry including the provision of
public data communication services.
This is a crucial reason why, in the
early 1970s and for the next decade,
AT&T granted Unix licences and made
the source code available to universities
and research organisations at a nominal
fee. It was also the hope of AT&T that the
implementation of Unix on many com-
puters would stimulate computer net-
working and thereby generate traffic on
the telephone lines. This expectation
partly materialised after Unix-based
software for the exchange of information
between computers was developed
(Leib & Werle, 1998). The Unix-to-Unix
Copy Protocol (UUCP) provided the soft-
ware backbone of Usenet, a system of
newsgroups and bulletin boards which
was later absorbed by the Internet
(Hauben & Hauben, 1997).
In the 1970s Unix was freely shared
with university researchers and develop-
Holtgrewe 11.12.2001, 16:2151
Science Studies 2/2001
52
ers. In this context, Dennis Ritchie, one
of the Unix inventors, aimed to build not
just an operating system and a program-
ming environment, but also “a system
around which a fellowship could form”
(Ritchie, quoted in Grassmuck, 2000: 3).
This fellowship was rooted in the tradi-
tions of academic research and publica-
tion and of telecommunications engi-
neering with its established orientation
towards interconnectivity. Consequently,
Unix became a popular operating system
among universities and laboratories that
both used and developed the system.
Collaboration was close especially
with computer scientists at Berkeley
University, who in 1980 gained contracts
from the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) to modify Unix
for computer networking (McKusick,
1999; Wayner, 2000). They improved
AT&T’s Unix and built the Internet pro-
tocol stack TCP/IP on top of it. Their re-
leases were distributed under a liberal
licence which permitted the redistribu-
tion of both modified and unmodified
code, in source code or binary versions,
provided that the copyright in the source
code was not changed and Berkeley was
given credit in the documentation. Since
the code AT&T had contributed to these
distributions was not free, however, us-
ers still needed to license Unix from
AT&T. TCP/IP in turn was distributed
with AT&T’s Unix as well.
Incipient Commercialisation and
Resistance
With the emerging commercial interest
in software as a commodity, conflicts be-
tween commercial interest and the col-
laborative academic/engineering tradi-
tions arose and were constitutive for the
invention of open source/free software.
Keeping up the traditional modes of col-
laboration required some social innova-
tion.
In the 1980s, companies such as Mi-
crosoft, Borland, Lotus or Novell had be-
gun to commercialise software and dis-
tribute binary versions. American uni-
versities were legally entitled to appropri-
ate, patent and sell scientific and techno-
logical knowledge which arose from fed-
erally funded research (Etzkowitz, 1994).
University labs thus set up strong links to
private industry and spun off commer-
cial companies. After AT&T’s divestiture
in 1984 the corporation entered the com-
puter market and expected its Unix Sys-
tems Laboratory to make a profit. AT&T
required university collaborators to sign
nondisclosure agreements and increased
licence fees for the source code of their
Unix. The commercial activities increas-
ingly focused on the distribution of sta-
ble commercial releases as opposed to re-
search and experimentation.
Academic developers/authors whose
work had gone into the software fre-
quently felt expropriated by having to
license the basics of their own work in
the case of AT&T and Berkeley (Wayner,
2000: 51) or by seeing their commitment
to free sharing and access violated. This
process of software commodification
mobilised resistance. Developers started
to build their own free Unix versions and
they invented the institutional structures
to protect and support these activities.
The roots of this resistance then were
both the professional norms of aca-
demic computer science and the coun-
ter-cultural commitments of hacker-
dom. The commodification of software
was perceived as a threat to the norms
and practices of sharing information
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and to the perquisites of Unix hackers’
creativity – and this threat, in turn,
caused developer communities to reflect
on the institutional and social contexts
of their practices.
In the 1980s, the prominent open
source/free software projects of GNU and
BSD represent contrasting rationales of
a struggle against commodification,
which we call disentanglement and activ-
ism. These carry associations of Albert
Hirschmann’s (1974) distinction between
exit and voice, but with a specific empha-
sis on skill and innovation. In the social
spheres of computer science and hacker-
dom, technical competence manifests it-
self as a strong norm of inventive prob-
lem-solving: The highly valued response
to a problem, be it a deficient or faulty
tool or application, is not just to identify
the problem and complain about it, but
to directly provide and circulate a solu-
tion. This norm of technological practice
and creativity was now applied to the
social and legal context as well. Open
source/free software projects focused on
both the rebuilding of proprietary soft-
ware and the development of social in-
novations which facilitate collaborative
development and prevent the results
from commodification.
Disentangling Unix Code and Pioneering
Informal Collaboration
In response to AT&T’s strategy of soft-
ware commodification the Berkeley
Computer Science Research Group
(BCSRG) began to explore ways of “lib-
erating” their code from AT&T’s licences
(Wayner, 2000: 43ff.; cf. McKusick, 1999).
They first distributed their TCP/IP stack
separately under the Berkeley Software
Distribution (BSD) licence. It was put on
the Internet and soon became the refer-
ence standard for the Internet. This in-
creased interest in Berkeley’s develop-
ments, which led the group to make a
bigger effort. Keith Bostic “pioneered the
technique of doing a mass net-based
development effort” (McKusick, 1999) by
mobilising colleagues, friends and ac-
quaintances to rebuild the Unix utilities
owned by AT&T. This opened up infor-
mal collaboration beyond small teams
of professionals and academics.
The kernel of the operating system
was extremely difficult to rebuild since
it contained code of both AT&T and
Berkeley. In a quasi-philological effort,
developers built a database to disentan-
gle the parts and then rewrote the AT&T-
owned code. The result, the modestly
named “Network Release 2”, was a near
complete Unix system. It was completed
and ported to different hardware both by
companies and free groups of develop-
ers. Eventually a variety of more or less
incompatible Unix systems emerged (cf.
Wayner, 2000: 49ff.).
Activism: Hacking Software and
Maintaining Freedom
On the east coast of the USA, Richard
Stallman, frustrated by the proliferation
of restrictions on the free sharing of code
at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology’s Artificial Intelligence Lab, initi-
ated the GNU (a recursive acronym for
“GNU’s not Unix”) project and founded
the Free Software Foundation in 1984 to
create a free version of Unix. He devel-
oped several widely used programming
tools and became a leading open source/
free software activist. Most significant is
his legal construction of a licence, the so-
called copyleft (cf. http://www.gnu.org),
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which was to guarantee that open source
software could always be distributed
freely. This “General Public License”
(GPL) does not simply rule that products
are free; it allows free distribution only
on the condition that further develop-
ments and applications are placed un-
der the same licence. Anyone who re-
leases software that incorporates GPL-
licenced code is compelled to use the
GPL in the new release. The point of the
GPL thus is its “infective” character. It is
a tricky construction, which uses the le-
gal instruments of copyright to subvert
intellectual property. Copyright gener-
ally allows its holder to determine the
conditions of the distribution and – up
to a point – use of their products. Copy-
left (“all rights reversed”) ties the prod-
uct to the conditions of open use. This
attempt to tie oneself and others to free-
dom and creative variety represents the
social movement side of open source/
free software, since it addresses ques-
tions of social transformation in the di-
rection of freedom, learning, use-value
and intelligent and cooperative use of
products. Institutions, especially institu-
tions of intellectual property hindering
creative appropriation and develop-
ment, are challenged and transformed.
The innovative and somewhat para-
doxical construction of GPL copyleft has
not become the standard for open
source/free software communities.
Rather, it has stimulated the prolifera-
tion of diverse licences developed by dif-
ferent influential projects, which secure
openness but limit the infectiveness of
the GPL (Perens, 1999). Open source li-
censes differ depending on the impor-
tance that is given to the following issues
(Working Group, 2000: 8):
“Protection of openness. Some licences
insist in that any redistributor main-
tains the same licence, and hence, re-
cipient’s rights are the same, whether
the software is received directly from
the author, or from any intermediary
part.
Protection of moral rights. In many
countries, legislation protects some
moral rights, like acknowledgement of
authorship. Some licences also provide
protection for these matters, making
them immune to changes in local leg-
islation.
Protection of some proprietary rights.
In some cases, the “first author” (the
party that originally made the piece of
software) have some additional rights,
which in some sense are a kind of “ pro-
prietary” rights.
Compatibility with proprietary licences.
Some licences are designed so that they
are completely incompatible with pro-
prietary software. For instance, it can be
forbidden to redistribute any software
which is a result of a mix of software
covered by the licence with any kind of
proprietary software.
Compatibility with other open source
licenses. Some open source licences are
not compatible with each other, be-
cause the conditions of one cannot be
fulfilled if the conditions imposed by
the other are satisfied. In this case, it is
usually impossible to mix software cov-
ered by those licenses in the same piece
of software.”
The reasons for this are not just authors’
claims on intellectual property rights.
The demands of the GPL tend to create
problems as soon as open source devel-
opments meet proprietary software and
hardware specifications. If, for instance,
an interface of open software with a
commercial program is to be developed
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or hardware drivers are to be written,
cooperation with commercial software
firms is unavoidable because informa-
tion about the proprietary systems is re-
quired. Even if the firms agree to coop-
erate they are unlikely to give up their
own property rights.
Linux in the 1990s: Popularisation and Re-
Entanglement
Open source/free software develop-
ments in the 1980s made use of the
spaces for technological development
under conditions of professional au-
tonomy, which the Internet was based
on – and which the technology in turn
reinforced when open standards were
established. When commercial interests
emerged, the open source/free software
community explicitly defended these
spaces, the norms of scientific collabo-
ration and publication and the public
good character of their products. To do
this, they drew on their own program-
ming skills and their access to the means
of production, i.e. computers and source
code. Yet they also developed modes of
cooperation through the Internet and
rules such as the copyleft to legally pro-
tect open source. Thus in the 1980s open
source was not a purely moral commit-
ment, but chiefly remained the domain
of professionals and experts.
In the 1990s, open source/free soft-
ware spread and gained public attention
beyond the computer labs and hacker
communities. Linux is considered by
some as a realistic alternative for every-
day computer users (if they have friends
skilled in computers), and the open
source/free software mode of voluntary
cooperation is currently being discussed
both as a post-capitalist model for a lib-
erated society (Grassmuck, 2000) and as
a paradigm of innovation and knowl-
edge management (Moon & Sproull,
2000; Tuomi, 2001).
The success of Linux has taken place
in an institutional context which is differ-
ent from the 1980s. First personal com-
puters and then Internet access have be-
come affordable consumer goods for pri-
vate households in industrialised coun-
tries. This makes global access to infor-
mation and knowledge goods possible
and facilitates communication and co-
operation beyond well-equipped offices
and labs. As a result, amateur expertise
outside professional computing has de-
veloped, notwithstanding that standard-
ised application software no longer re-
quires users to have programming skills.
The “hacker ethic” (Himanen, 2001) of
technological expressiveness, creativity,
global cooperation and sharing has
spread beyond the world of professional
computing to hobbyists of all kinds, net
activists, and school children – together
with and in spite of the frequently de-
plored commercialisation of content
and standardisation of applications.
On the economic side, the expansion
of the Internet has been part of funda-
mental changes in both hardware and
software industries (Borrus & Zysman,
1997; Buss & Wittke, 2000). In general,
innovation and value chains have been
fragmented, moving from the vertically
integrated systems manufacturers of the
1970s to a differentiated, more modular
pattern. Hardware design, manufacture
and assembly, software development for
operating systems, standard applica-
tions, and user-specific adaptation, sys-
tem integration and consulting services
have been taken over by specialised
companies. These compete and cooper-
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ate both across and along value chains.
We have “Wintelism” on the one side,
denoting de facto monopolies in cir-
cumscribed sectors such as, notoriously,
PC operating systems (Microsoft), as
well as Internet routers (Cisco Systems)
and fluid, networked structures on the
other side, with firms cooperating, stra-
tegically merging, outsourcing and mov-
ing into neighbouring fields and out
again (Naschold et al., 1999). Govern-
ments tend to leave the provision of in-
frastructures that have traditionally
been regarded as public goods to the
market or to private sponsorship and
public self-help schemes. Universities
and research institutions find them-
selves competing for marketable inno-
vations, and public funding of research
and development is increasingly com-
mitted to deliver marketable results.
The institutional ensemble in the
1990s thus grants the market a larger
space and the interactions and relation-
ships of organisations and firms are more
flexible and selective. Generally, incen-
tives and pressures to commodify knowl-
edge prevail. Yet in the field of software
development the situation is ambiguous.
Open source/free software is confronted
with the tendencies to re-commodify
software, but at the same time the advan-
tages of de-commodified technology de-
velopment are being discovered.
Originally, Linux was the kernel of a
free, Unix-compatible operating system
developed by Helsinki computer science
student Linus Torvalds. Towards the end
of 1990, he began to build a kernel for
his 386 PC and looked for collaborators
and found immediate support from in-
terested communities of developers. The
success of the project was based on sev-
eral factors, three of them being suffi-
cient availability of PCs, useful docu-
mentation of Unix, and Minix, a small
simplified Unix clone running on PCs.
Minix had been developed to train stu-
dents in operating systems and it had a
large and lively user community. Tor-
valds released the source code of his op-
erating system in autumn 1991. Ac-
cording to the norms of hacker culture,
he put Linux under the GPL. It soon be-
came the most prominent exemplar of
decentralised collaborative develop-
ment and involved up to 40,000 people
under the “benevolent dictatorship” of
Torvalds and a core team, who coordi-
nated and maintained subprojects with
quick and frequent releases which were
just as quickly tested and improved.
In 1994 the first official Linux version
(1.0) was released. After that, many new
networks of developers entered the
project and provided it with new oppor-
tunities and constraints. Support, to-
gether with commercial interest, came
from hardware manufacturers who were
interested in ports to their hardware.
Frequently, developers in the companies
promoted this interest. It was also in the
early 1990s that the first companies were
founded by Linux developers. These
firms sell Linux distributions (Red Hat,
SuSE and others), and/or offer software
support, training and consulting serv-
ices, customise software solutions based
on open source or publish handbooks
and magazines (West & Dedrick, 2001).
This shows that open source/free soft-
ware is not necessarily incompatible
with business interests. It is accepted as
legitimate to make money with services
related to open source/free software.
Companies hire developers who con-
tinue working on free projects, grant
hardware to open source projects and
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sponsor programming camps and con-
ferences. They also give up exclusive
property rights to software in the inter-
ests of maintaining the public good,
which has developed into an essential
element of their business.
Also, in recent years foundations such
as the Center for the Public Domain
(http://www.centerpd.org) have been
established, which provide funding and
information to diverse free software
groups, bring together academic ex-
perts, activists and entrepreneurs and
oversee fair social exchange between the
business and the non-profit community.
This does not mean that the relations
between the commercial and the non-
commercial sphere are always harmoni-
ous. There is an ongoing controversy
over whether “freedom” is to be under-
stood as a commitment to use-value and
public goods or as freedom to partici-
pate in the market (cf. DiBona et al.,
1999). This in fact distinguishes the pro-
moters of free software (Stallman and
the GNU and Free Software Founda-
tions) from open source (Eric Raymond,
Bruce Perens and the Open Source
Foundation). Tensions also arise from
the diffusion of Linux products to lay
users, both consumers and companies.
They increasingly demand easy-to-use
solutions, which directly compete with
commercial software. Firms tend to tol-
erate resulting losses as long as they have
the feeling that Microsoft is the firm to
be hurt most by the open source prod-
ucts. However, the pressure on the non-
profit communities will increase if and
when commercial firms experience
competition with open source products
as a kind of expropriation through, for
instance, the extension of copyleft to
originally proprietary software.
The Interests and the Passions:
Open Source/Free Software
in Context
Research and development in the area
of computer software is a form of knowl-
edge production which, like other areas
of knowledge production, has increas-
ingly become subject to commodi-
fication (David, 2000). This includes the
devolution of intellectual property rights
from individual academic researchers
to institutions of higher education
(Etzkowitz, 1994). The transformation of
science from a public to a private good
is controversial (Webster & Packer, 1997)
and necessarily incomplete. Similarly,
the commodification of software has
evoked counter-reactions, with open
source/free software being the most
prominent one. But can it really be con-
sidered a radical challenge to commodi-
fication? The answer to this question is
both no and yes. The balance tilts to-
wards no if we look at the strategic use
of open source/free software by firms
and also by governments. It tilts towards
yes if our focus is on the community of
open source developers and on the so-
cial innovations connected with it.
Our examination of the Open Systems
Movement has already shown that open-
ness and de-commodification do not
necessarily mean a transformation of
the institutions of intellectual property.
In this context, the openness argument
was an “unconventional” one, that is to
say, a new element of a business strat-
egy (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993: 358)
which gave up some property rights in
order to open up new markets. Since the
demise of the Open Systems Movement,
firms have continued to use open strat-
egies as a means of entering a market.
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Confronted with open source/free soft-
ware they are increasingly trying to de-
velop ”hybrid” licensing arrangements
which make use of the possibilities of the
open source/free software development
models (external contributions to devel-
opment), while seeking to avoid compro-
mising intellectual property rights. Sun
Microsystems, for instance, has been ex-
tremely successful using this strategy of
relinquishing control in favour of adop-
tion. Sun offers open sources strategically
under the Sun Community Source Li-
cense, which allows free access, experi-
mentation and internal deployment,
while retaining control over testing and
distribution (Working Group, 2000: 9).
Unlike the conventional openness ar-
gument which originated in the Opens
Systems Movement, the open source/free
software idea challenges the boundaries
of intellectual property rights, and in-
deed, companies experimenting with li-
cences come under careful scrutiny vis-
à-vis the definition of proper open or free
licences (Perens, 1999). Yet in the late
1990s, several ITC firms such as Netscape
and Apple started to release the source
code for some of their products under
“open” licences in order to receive input
from external developers and to achieve
compatibility of open source/free soft-
ware with their own products and thereby
improve these products. Today, HP,
Compaq, Dell and even Intel and IBM
also support or participate in open
source projects (West & Dedrick, 2001).
The only big player in the ICT industry
which explicitly counters open source/
free software is Microsoft, whose prevail-
ing position in the market for operating
systems is being challenged by Linux.
Microsoft has not only acknowledged
the specific pressure being exerted by
Linux, but the firm has also conceded
that open source/free software repre-
sents a long-term strategic threat be-
cause it is not compatible with the firm’s
licensing model (www. opensource.org/
halloween; Weber, 2000: 11).Supporting
open source, such as Linux, represents a
low-cost and low-risk attempt by hard-
ware and software companies to re-es-
tablish competition and open up alterna-
tives to cooperation with the monopolist
(Winzerling, 2001). Again, commitments
to openness emerge as the classical weak
competitors’ strategy intending to join
forces and counterattack the market
leader. Open source is increasingly
viewed as a viable option to collectively
developing software which can be used
and sold complementary to or bundled
with proprietary hardware or software
products. Hardware vendors make com-
mitments to open source/free software in
order to make inroads into new market
segments with their proprietary hard-
ware on which open source code runs.
Generally, firms are careful not to surren-
der the intellectual property rights of their
own products. If they release source code,
more often than not they attach provi-
sions that assert their property rights to
modifications of the original code or at
least prevent others from claiming prop-
erty rights to these modifications.
Yet, even the GPL and the other copy-
left licences enable new business mod-
els based on open source/free software
as a public good. Opening source code
does not necessarily mean that it is dis-
tributed completely free of charge. If a
distributing or developing company
cannot commodify the software, the li-
cences guarantee that competitors can-
not either, and that improvements and
modifications will be open as well.
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Thus open source/free software strat-
egies are not completely different from
commercial concepts of customer orien-
tation and collaborative development,
which frequently require some sharing
of knowledge between developers and
users. Nor are they completely different
from joint development efforts among
competitors (Naschold et al., 1999). They
are, however, aimed not just at gaining
market share and limiting development
costs, but rather at “changing the rules
in the information technology industry”
(Working Group, 2000: 27). Firms have
accommodated their business strategies
to these tendencies in a variety of ways
aiming at an advantageous co-existence
of releasing and preserving property.
This does not necessarily create a stable
“equilibrium”. However, it has become
less likely that intellectual property
claims on the part of firms will trigger a
process of “forking”, in which – as with
Unix – a system branches into often pro-
prietary, incompatible versions. Copyleft
provisions of the GPL-type have so far
succeeded to protect the public good
nature of open source/free software. Yet,
apart from this institutional solution, the
firms’ accumulated experience of how to
take advantage of the merits of open
source/free software without compro-
mising the intellectual property of core
assets and, possibly, increased aware-
ness of the role of public goods in knowl-
edge production and innovation sug-
gests that the history of Unix will not re-
peat itself with Linux.
Not only business firms but also gov-
ernments are affected by and react to
open source/free software. Generally,
they take an ambiguous stance, al-
though political interest is increasing. In
the era of the Open Systems Movement,
European governments, in particular,
promoted openness if it promised to
serve industrial political goals. In the
course of deregulation and liberalisation
of the markets for information and com-
munication technology and services, of
European integration and of economic
globalisation, the idea of openness was
linked to a stimulation of competition
both nationally and across borders. Tel-
ecommunications network operators
were obliged to grant competitors access
to their networks by disclosing interface
specifications or implementing open
interface standards. At the international
level, governments committed them-
selves to open international standards.
Diverging national standards and propri-
etary standards were identified as non-
tariff barriers to trade (Werle, 2001b).
Openness was expected to increase com-
petition, stimulate innovation and boost
economic welfare.
This situation is similar with open
source/free software, which is also pro-
moted by some governments to serve
industrial policy goals. Recently, the Eu-
ropean Union General Directorate for
the Information Society initiated the
creation of the Working Group on Libre
Software, consisting of open source/free
software developers from universities,
research institutes and companies who
have outlined the perspectives for open
source/free software in Europe (http://
eu.conecta.it/). Beyond the technical
and cost advantages accruing from the
extended use and intensified develop-
ment of open source/free software, this
group expects a renewal of competition
in the software industry with competi-
tive advantages for European compa-
nies. It suggests initial funding for prom-
ising projects, the support of testing fa-
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cilities, and the use of open source/free
software in public administration and
education. Consequently, in the 7th call
of the EU research programme “Infor-
mation Society Technologies”, open
source/free software projects are explic-
itly invited. While supporting open
source/free software the EU stresses at
the same time, in a Commission Green
Paper on the patent system in Europe,
that it is ”vital to protect the fruits of in-
novation” through patenting because
companies which sell patented products
“have a competitive advantage when it
comes to maintaining or expanding
their market share.” Patents on compu-
ter programs and software-related in-
ventions are explicitly included (Euro-
pean Commission, 2001: 1, 16).
The US government has traditionally
supported open source/free software in
universities and public research labs
(Seiferth, 1999). Its cheapness accounts
to a considerable degree for the rapid
diffusion of the Internet in the US aca-
demic and research sector. However, it
is also acknowledged that the Internet’s
openness has stimulated creativity and
innovation (CSTB, 2001: 107-150). Yet,
the right of private firms to patent soft-
ware that has been developed in the con-
text of publicly supported projects has
never been challenged by the US govern-
ment (CSTB, 1999: 40-51).
Thus if governments are interested in
open source/free software they eagerly
try to avoid the impression that they agree
with ideas of a fundamental transforma-
tion in the system of individual intellec-
tual property rights (IPR). They acknowl-
edge that IPR provide incentives to inno-
vate but – when arguing in favour of open
source/free software – they also stress
that, while too little protection of intel-
lectual property prevents innovations,
too much protection and the resulting
“patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) may pre-
vent the diffusion and recombination of
knowledge.
Yet as we have seen, open source/free
software is not simply the result of col-
lective actors’ rational economic and po-
litical strategies of interest maximisation.
It has been initiated and sustained by
developers’ normative commitments to
creative self-expression, sharing and in-
formal collaboration which merge tech-
nological and social innovation.
Hackerdom may be seen as the en-
semble of cultural and technological
practices and normative motivations,
which aim at innovative modes of infor-
mal collaborative software development
and at new forms of licensing as tools for
sustaining creativity. These motivations
contain a logic of social movements ad-
dressing the transformation of the insti-
tutions of innovation. Innovation should
not be exclusively associated with paid
work and material gratification, but also
regarded as an element of freedom,
learning, and the intelligent and coop-
erative use of products which empha-
sises their use-value rather than their
exchange-value. Institutions, especially
those of traditional intellectual property
rights, are viewed as hindering the crea-
tive appropriation and development of
innovations and thus are challenged and
transformed.
Conclusion: Open Source Between
Commodification and De-
Commodification
The idea of openness and the normative
commitments to this idea have their roots
outside the commercial sphere. Different
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traditions converge. They include a gen-
eral understanding of academic, particu-
larly basic research as a public good, a
professional engineering view of tel-
ecommunications as a public infrastruc-
ture connecting people worldwide, and
a conviction of computer scientists and
engineers that open cooperation facili-
tates efficient and innovative use of soft-
ware and hardware. They also include the
interpretation of freedom as free access
to computers, decentralisation of organi-
sational structures and availability of
space for creativity emphasised by the so-
called hackers-communities of compu-
ter enthusiasts which comprise chiefly
students and professionals of computer
science and engineering, but also ama-
teurs and autodidacts.
In the era of the Open Systems Move-
ment the idea of openness was used pre-
dominantly to legitimise industrial
policy and forge coalitions of business
firms against monopolies. As openness
was not intended to be anti-commercial,
changing the traditional order of intel-
lectual property rights was not an issue.
Hackerdom appears to be the addi-
tional element that has to be considered
if we are to understand the way in which
the traditional concept of openness was
extended towards open source/free soft-
ware. Open source/free software chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that
individual appropriability of the rev-
enues on innovations is the institutional
conditio sine qua non of an innovative
and economically prosperous society.
Such commodification may even be re-
garded as a threat to the wealth of a na-
tion because it jeopardises long-term
innovation by limiting access to knowl-
edge and technology.
Open source/free software is by design
a process rather than a product. If source
code is provided along with software
packages or protocol stacks, these “prod-
ucts” can be easily modified and im-
proved by users who at the same time are
developers. Thus, it is difficult to protect
individual intellectual property on pieces
of open source software. As a social
project open source/free software relies
on the collaborative development of soft-
ware and on sustaining the preconditions
of such collaboration. Professional engi-
neers cooperate with students of compu-
ter science, private industry exchanges
pieces of software with public research
and development units, hobbyists trade
ideas with business people, political ide-
alists who believe in the power of com-
puters to change human life for better talk
with realists who want to use machine
power to make the status-quo more effi-
cient. Frequently, people involved in
open source/free software also play mul-
tiple roles themselves. They are, of course,
users and developers of software, they
invent new institutions of property rights
such as copyleft and they develop the
normative “theoretical” basis of the
movement. They also move between
multiple engagements in companies,
networks and projects cross-cutting or-
ganisational and social boundaries. As
“knowledgeable actors” they mediate
between diverse organisational, profes-
sional and ideological (epistemic) com-
munities (cf. Giddens, 1984). Who owns
the results of such socially heterogene-
ous collaboration, such genuinely new
modes of knowledge production?
Business firms avoid this question
when they feel that participation in open
source/free software can help to make
inroads into new markets and challenge
dominant firms. Likewise, governments
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shy away from this question if they pro-
mote open source developments as
cheap and flexible elements of a public
knowledge infrastructure. Developers
are not interested either if they get in-
volved in open source to enjoy creativ-
ity and gain recognition and reputation.
Thus what evolves is neither public
nor private, neither individual nor col-
lective property. It is rather a fluid, hy-
brid mosaic of components, some of
which are protected by copyright, oth-
ers by copyleft and others again not pro-
tected at all. Each open source/free soft-
ware project is precarious. It depends on
a spirit of collaboration and diffuse reci-
procity, as well as technological and in-
stitutional innovativeness and, to some
extent, assurance against commodi-
fication. The latter is provided as long as
the checks and balances of open source/
free software work – these include a so-
cial movement which addresses the
sustainability of creativity.
Notes
 1 Richard Stallman, one of the central pro-
moters of open source/free software dis-
tinguishes between the meaning of “free
beer” and “free speech”. In Europe the
term “libre software” (French “libre” as op-
posed to “gratuit”) is used ( Working
Group, 2000).
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